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relation between basic actions done by God in a creature and the activities of
the creature. This problem is particularly acute if God's basic actions include
those movements of the bodies of humans which are part of the repertoire of
basic actions for them, for Tracy himself says that no basic action can be the
action of two agents (p. 82).
It is possible to distinguish the implications for the concept of God of Tracy's
analysis of how we identify agents (in terms of patterns in their actions) and of
his discussion of God as a nonembodied perfect agent. Although the former
raises fewer problems than the latter, it is not without its problems. Tracy seems
to conclude that we identify God as the agent of certain large-scale actions (e.g.,
delivering Israel from Egypt) without specifying the sub-actions by which this
is accomplished (pp. 77-83). I think that this idea has merit as a statement of
how many believers operate. And certainly it is not impossible to do this for
human agents. (I might say that Eisenhower commanded the D-Day invasion
without knowing in detail how he did it.) But if (as Tracy admits) one lacks any
idea of possible sub-actions by which God does things, this approach becomes
more problematic. And if (like Bultmann) one holds a scientific view which
seems to render divine sub-actions impossible, then our inability to specify
sub-actions might lead us to question whether there were any large-scale actions
at all. Tracy is aware of this problem (cf. end of Part II) and says that specifying
sub-actions is the task of particular theologies; but that seems to make the
usefulness of his proposal heavily dependent on the theologian's ability to do this.
I raise these questions not to demean the book's value but to highlight it.
Many of them concern issues beyond the scope of the book. It is because Tracy
has done so well what he set out to do that his conclusions deserve to be brought
into relation with other bases for constructing a doctrine of God. In my questions
I have certainly not touched on all these other bases. And none of them are
themselves beyond question. But Tracy's work deserves careful consideration
by anyone who wishes to use the language of agency as one of the bases for his
theological constructions.

Crisis in Consciousness: The Thought of Ernst Troeltsch, by Robert J.
Rubanowice. Tallahassee: University Presses of Florida, 1983. Pp. xxiii, 177.
$20.
Reviewed by RUSSELL T. BLACKWOOD, Hamilton College.
This volume is more an excursion in intellectual history than it is a treatise
in philosophy or theology. As such, it is a miniature encyclopaedia of the thought
and work of an eminently important historicist. A generous Foreword by James
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Luther Adams points to the ambiguous relationship between the thought of
Troeltsch and that of Tillich. Adams also claims, with some justification, a
current "Troeltsch revival." Rubanowice, in the Preface, cites approvingly Emil
Spiess's assertion that Troeltsch was "the greatest theologian of German Protestantism"-a claim that, at the very least, is difficult to sustain.
Nonetheless, this is an extraordinarily useful work. Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923)
was not only a representative of an age of crisis but an important influence on
many thinkers in the even more troubled decades after his death. The growing
recognition of this latter fact provides some evidence in support of Adams' claim
of a revival. Rubanowice argues that the cultural crisis in which Troeltsch found
himself was a world where "everything is tottering." Such a world was one
where "absoluteness" had failed. On the one hand he saw a crisis of confidence
in traditional Christian faith; on the other hand he found a decline in the political
and social influence of the historical churches. Most profoundly he perceived
that if Christianity were to be an historical religion it could not be absolute
religion. While Troeltsch never lost his personal faith he came to believe that
Christianity could not claim validity beyond the bounds of Western civilization.
The key to most of Troeltsch's thought is his view of historicism (Historismus).
Originally influenced by, but then rejecting, the Ritschlian Heilsgeschichte
Troeltsch established his own religionsgeschichtliche Schule. This movement
led to a sort of sociology of religion in which all faiths, including Christianity,
were to be studied "purely on the basis of historical development with every
renunciation of a supernatural information and foundation." Rubanowice claims
that Troeltsch's historicism "rejects any static view of eternal ideas" and "regards
truth, values and institutions as related to specific historical times and places."
But, Rubanowice argues, Troeltsch's historicism did not entail relativism, as
Tillich has claimed. Historicism does involve "relationism" (seeing values and
institutions in relation to their historical setting) and while relationism might
tempt one to relativism it does not entail it, Troeltsch asserted. This sort of
tight-rope walking led to his central concept of "polymorphous truth." On this
notion certain claims are true ("valid" is a term frequently employed) for Europeans, for example, but not true or valid for Orientals. However, the claim that
certain assertions are "true for us" (but perhaps not for them) must be distinguished, it seems to me, from James's "faith ladder" where we have the right
to believe certain claims as "true for us." In James, the right to believe was
always subject to correction in the face of new evidence. But, for Europeans,
Troeltsch claimed that Christianity is "final and unconditional for us."
All of this sort of talk is something of a muddle, albeit an interesting muddle.
H. Richard Niebuhr once described Troeltsch's position as "non-sceptical
relativism." Rubanowice's understanding of Troeltsch is more or less the same.
And that is interesting; but it would be even more interesting if this work had
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attempted to set out a philosophically clear statement of the relation between
relativism and truth. That, of course, was really Troeltsch's task and one which
occupied him and the religionsgeschichtliche Schule for some time and without
notable success. But it would have been interesting to see Rubanowice wrestle
more thoroughly with the matter.
Troeltsch's religionsgeschichtliche method and his notion of polymorphous
truth carry over into his philosophy of history. There is, he claimed, "not merely
one logic of human thinking, but various logics." Again, this is an interesting
claim but one which needs careful philosophic analysis.
The final chapter of this work traces Troeltsch's life in politics from 1914 to
1923. It shows an intellectual tom by his complicated view of history and religion
and by his Germanness.
A final epilogue rejects the conventional judgment that Troeltsch failed to
resolve the crisis of values he had uncovered. Rubanowice believes that the
answer is ambiguous. That Troeltsch was an important thinker Rubanowice quite
rightly leaves in no doubt. I would quarrel with ranking Troeltsch beside Hegel,
but that he belongs with Ritschl and Schleiermacher seems quite right.
The book has a superb selected bibliography. Some might argue that 820
footnotes in a 138-page volume are a bit much. However, intellectual historians,
while often not given to much philosophic analysis, are known for their meticulousness. This book is a fine and meticulous intellectual history of a complicated
theologian who profoundly displayed the nature of the crises we live with yet.

The Argument To The Other: Reason Beyond Reason in the Thought of Karl
Barth and Emmanuel Levinas, by Steven G. Smith. Chico, CA: Scholars Press,
1983. Pp. 307. $20.95.
Reviewed by EUGENE THOMAS LONG, University of South Carolina.
This comparative study of Karl Barth and Emmanuel Levinas was the author's
dissertation directed by William Poteat at Duke University. Although there is
no evidence that either Barth or Levinas was influenced by the other, and although
Barth appeals primarily to the Christian faith and Levinas to phenomenology
and the Jewish faith, Smith argues that they share in common a preoccupation
with transcendence or the Other which changes the ground rules for thinking
and speaking of God, and hence for philosophy and theology. For Karl Barth
the Other is the transcendent God of Biblical Christian faith whose infinite
qualitative difference from man and the world makes impossible any analogy in
human experience. For Levinas the Other is the other person, ultimately the
other person in his nearness to God, but this Other is also said to be beyond the

